Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Seo, K. Internet Draft Watro, R. Expires: September 2009 Kong, D. Intended Status: Informational Kent, S. BBN Technologies March 6, 2009 Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI) draft-ietf-sidr-cp-05.txt Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html This Internet-Draft will expire on September 30, 2009. Abstract This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to support applications that make use of attestations about Internet resource holdings. The principle application that motivated creation of this PKI is routing security, but other applications that rely on such attestations also may make use of this PKI, e.g., resource transfer. Each organization that allocates IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 will enable verification that the holder of the associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this policy are employed, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms. Table of Contents 1. Introduction...................................................7 1.1. Conventions used in this document.........................8 1.2. Overview..................................................8 1.3. Document name and identification..........................9 1.4. PKI participants..........................................9 1.4.1. Certification authorities...........................10 1.4.2. Registration authorities............................10 1.4.3. Subscribers.........................................10 1.4.4. Relying parties.....................................10 1.4.5. Other participants..................................11 1.5. Certificate usage........................................11 1.5.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................11 1.5.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................11 1.6. Policy administration....................................11 1.6.1. Organization administering the document.............11 1.6.2. Contact person......................................12 1.6.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy....13 1.6.4. CP approval procedures..............................13 1.7. Definitions and acronyms.................................13 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 2.1. Repositories.............................................15 2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 2.3. Time or frequency of publication.........................15 2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 3. Identification and Authentication.............................17 3.1. Naming...................................................17 3.1.1. Types of names......................................17 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17 Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 2 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.........................................18 3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19 3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key.............................................19 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation...................................19 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.................................................20 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21 4.1. Certificate Application..................................21 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21 4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions..........................................21 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications.......................................22 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate.....................................22 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities..................................22 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............23 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................23 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........23 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber.........................................24 Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 3 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate........................................24 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities..................................24 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key................................................25 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber.........................................25 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate........................................25 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA.................................................25 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities..................................25 4.8. Certificate modification.................................25 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........25 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26 4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber.........................................26 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate........................................26 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA.................................................26 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities..................................26 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................27 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request............................................27 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties............................................27 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................27 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28 4.10. Certificate status services.............................28 5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................29 5.1. Physical controls........................................29 5.2. Procedural controls......................................29 Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 4 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 5.3. Personnel controls.......................................29 5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29 5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................30 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................30 5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30 5.6. Key changeover...........................................30 5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................30 6. Technical Security Controls...................................31 6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................31 6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................31 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................31 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........31 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........31 6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................32 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking...........................................32 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field).............................................32 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls....................................32 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........32 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......32 6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................32 6.2.4. Private key backup..................................33 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................33 6.3.1. Public key archival.................................33 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods......................................33 6.5. Computer security controls...............................33 6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................33 6.6.1. System development controls.........................33 6.6.2. Security management controls........................33 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................34 6.7. Network security controls................................34 6.8. Time-stamping............................................34 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................35 8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................36 9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................37 Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 5 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 9.12. Amendments..............................................37 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................37 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................37 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed......37 10. Security Considerations......................................38 11. IANA Considerations..........................................38 12. Acknowledgments..............................................38 13. References...................................................38 13.1. Normative References....................................38 13.2. Informative References..................................39 Author's Addresses...............................................40 Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................41 Copyright Statement..............................................41 Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 6 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 1. Introduction This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to attest to Internet resource holdings. An organization that allocates IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this policy are employed can be used in a number of ways, for example, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, it can be used to provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. This security infrastructure is described in more detail in [ARCH]. The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to address space and AS number holdings, with initial emphasis on support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this CP, and relying parties should reject certificates presented for such uses. Note that while the initial focus of the RPKI is routing security applications, other applications that make use of attestations of IP address or AS number resource holdings are within the scope of the RPKI, e.g., resource transfer applications. Note: This document is based on the template specified in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this policy because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in the RFC to facilitate comparison with the RFC. The first digit from the RFC Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 7 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 ("4") has been omitted and in cases where the RFC had bulleted items, we added a third level of numbering. So for example, RFC 3647's item 4.4.8 ("Certificate Modification") is listed here as just 4.8. The first bullet under this item ("Circumstances under which certificate modification can take place...") is listed here as 4.8.1. 1.1. Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. 1.2. Overview This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current holders of IP (v4 and v6) address space, and AS numbers, in accordance with the (current) records of the organizations that act as CAs in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unique, unambiguous allocation of these resources, and this, in turn, is an essential underpinning of routing in the public Internet. The proposed security infrastructure consists of three components: a PKI, repositories, and related, digitally signed objects (e.g., route origination authorizations (ROAs)). The PKI authoritatively documents the current allocation of address blocks and AS numbers to organizations, as recorded by the organizations that manage such allocations. (For brevity, this document uses the term "organization" to refer to every resource holder, even if the holder is an individual.) Repositories provide the means of publishing the PKI data (certificates and CRLs) and signed object data in a manner that makes it available to relying parties. The intent is for each network operator to upload its new or updated PKI and signed object data periodically to its publication repository, e.g., daily. On a similar schedule, each network operator also is expected to download new or updated data that has been published by others. This PKI parallels the existing IP address and AS number allocation hierarchy. These resources are allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs - AFRINIC (Africa), APNIC (Asia-Pacific), ARIN (North America), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and RIPE NCC (Europe) and by the RIRs to other organizations. Together IANA and the RIRs act as default trust anchors for the PKI. In some regions, National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the RIRs for address allocation. ISPs and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries. (ISPs who acquire allocations from RIRs or Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 8 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 NIRs, and who sub-allocate address space are referred to as Local Internet Registries (LIRs)). This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details): . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying ROAs and other (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system 1.3. Document name and identification The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)". This policy has been assigned the following OID: id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 } 1.4. PKI participants Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an organization that receives network services from an ISP. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 9 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 1.4.1. Certification authorities The organizations that allocate IP addresses (IANA, RIRs, NIRs, LIRs/ISPs) and AS numbers (IANA, RIRs and NIRs) act as CAs in this PKI. Organizations that hold address space and create and sign objects such as ROAs and manifests also act as CAs in this PKI. Such organizations will include internet number registries, LIRs/ISPs, provider-independent subscribers and some dual-homed subscribers. For each signed object an organization creates, it will issue a corresponding EE certificate that will be used to validate the digital signature on the signed object. (Organizations may issue other types of EE certificates in the future). See [ARCH] for more details. 1.4.2. Registration authorities This PKI does not require establishment or use of a separate registration authority (RA) in conjunction with the CA function. The RA function will be provided by the same entity operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with each organization to which it allocates IP address space and/or AS number resources. These organizations already perform the RA function implicitly since they already assume responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of address space and AS numbers. 1.4.3. Subscribers These are the organizations receiving allocations of IP addresses and AS numbers - RIRs, NIRs, LIRs, ISPs, and other organizations. See [ARCH] for more details. Note that any of these organizations may have received allocations from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs, which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This PKI accommodates such relationships. 1.4.4. Relying parties Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS number current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example, entities that make use of address and AS number allocation certificates in support of improved routing security are relying parties. This includes ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP traffic with ISPs, and subscribers who have received an Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 10 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 allocation of address space from ISP A but want to authorize ISP B to originate routes to this space. To the extent that repositories make use of certificates issued under this PKI for access control -- checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties. 1.4.5. Other participants Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system with the certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects that it issues. The organization can operate its own publication point or outsource this function (See sections 2.1 and 2.2.) 1.5. Certificate usage 1.5.1. Appropriate certificate uses The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy. Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the repository system. Such uses also are permitted under this policy. 1.5.2. Prohibited certificate uses Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited under this policy. 1.6. Policy administration 1.6.1. Organization administering the document This CP is co-administered by IANA and the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which act as default trust anchors for the PKI: AfriNIC (Africa) 03B3, 3rd Floor, Ebene Cyber Tower Cyber City, Ebene, Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 11 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 Mauritius APNIC (Asia-Pacific) Level 1, 33 Park Road, Milton, Brisbane, Australia ARIN (North America and Caribbean) 3635 Concorde Pkwy, Suite 200 Chantilly, VA 20151-1130 USA IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) 4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330 Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6601 USA LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean) Rambla Republica de Mexico 6125 Montevideo, 11400 Uruguay RIPE NCC (Europe) Singel 258 1016 AB Amsterdam The Netherlands 1.6.2. Contact person The contact information for this CP is: AfriNIC (Africa) e-mail: contact@afrinic.net phone: +230 466 6616 APNIC (Asia-Pacific) e-mail: helpdesk@apnic.net phone: +61 7 3858 3188 ARIN (North America and Caribbean) e-mail: hostmaster@arin.net phone: +1 703 227 0660 IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 12 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 e-mail: iana@iana.org phone: LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean) e-mail: hostmaster@lacnic.net phone: +598 2 6042222 RIPE NCC (Europe) e-mail: ncc@ripe.net phone: +31 20 535 444 1.6.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. These are the same organizations that perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 1.6.4. CP approval procedures Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organization is the same organization as the one that performs the allocation. 1.7. Definitions and acronyms BGP - Border Gateway Protocol. This is the protocol used in the Internet for propagating the connectivity information used as a basis for inter-domain routing. [BGP4] CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates. [e.g., CPS-1, CPS-2] IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet traffic. IANA allocates IP addresses and AS numbers to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). ISP - Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and selling Internet services to other organizations. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 13 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or National) Registry. NIR - National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation. NRO - Number Resource Organization. This organization was formed by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) for the purpose of undertaking joint activities of the five RIRs, including joint technical projects, liaison activities, and policy coordination. RIR - Regional Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs: AFRINIC (Africa), APNIC (Asia-Pacific), ARIN (North America), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and RIPE NCC (Europe). Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 14 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities 2.1. Repositories Certificates, CRLs, and related signed objects must be made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them to validate this data. This motivates use of a robust, distributed repository system. Each CA is responsible for publishing its signed products (certificates, CRLs, manifests, ROAs, etc.) at a dedicated publication point. The RPKI distributed repository system is the collection of these dedicated publication points. An organization may choose to outsource the publication of PKI data. (See [REPOS] for further details.) 2.2. Publication of certification information All CAs will publish certificates via the repository system. Each CA will publish the CRL(s) that it issues by uploading to the repository system. ROAs and other signed objects will be uploaded to the repository system by address space holders, e.g., network subscribers and ISPs/LIRs. An organization may choose to outsource publication of RPKI data - certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects. (See [REPOS] for further details.). 2.3. Time or frequency of publication The CPS for each CA will specify the following information: The period of time within which a certificate will be published after the CA issues the certificate. The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate. Note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. 2.4. Access controls on repositories Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data (certificates, CRLs, etc.) uploaded to a repository are digitally signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 15 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 16 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 3. Identification and Authentication 3.1. Naming 3.1.1. Types of names Names for IANA and RIRs will be directory distinguished names, using a subset of the following attributes: C, O, OU, and CN. Names for all other CAs and all end entities will consist of a single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful The Subject name in each certificate must be unique relative to all Subject names certified by an Issuer, but the name does not need to be meaningful. There is no requirement, and no guarantee, that subject names are globally unique in this PKI. The certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications that make use of attestations of Internet resource holding, not for identification. The PKI binds a public key to sets of address blocks, and/or sets of AS numbers. The name of the holder of the address block or AS number is not intended to be "meaningful". For purposes of routing security, the issuer and subject name in each certificate are not relevant, other than their needing to meet the usual PKI requirements for contextual uniqueness in support of unambiguous certificate path chaining. 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided. 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms None 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names Each CA certifies Subject names that must be unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced through technical means. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 17 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc. 3.2. Initial identity validation 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will require each Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by each CA and will be declared in the CPS of that CA. 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA has allocated (or sub-allocated) the address space identified in the certificate. The same requirement is imposed on the binding of one or more AS numbers in a certificate to the organization represented by the Subject. The specific procedures employed for this purpose are described by the CPS for each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative of each organization that is an address space (AS number) holder. This is done in support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. The specific means by which each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an organization are described by the CPS for each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for address space (AS number) holders. Moreover, this authentication is solely for use by each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it allocates (or sub-allocates) address space (or AS numbers), and thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber relationship. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 18 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy. 3.2.5. Validation of authority Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that organization in this context. The procedures are described by the CPS for the CA Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for address space (AS number) holders. 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI. 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. The procedures employed for these purposes are described in the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note: An issuer may choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual agreements with the recipient. If so, this will be described by the CPS for the CA. 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. The specific procedures employed for these purposes will be Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 19 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 described by the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key. 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space and AS numbers) to be revoked. The specific procedures employed for these purposes will be described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note: If new IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to an organization's existing allocation, the old certificate need not be revoked. Instead, a new certificate may issued with both the old and the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old certificate must be revoked (and a re-key must be performed in the event of key compromise). Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 20 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4.1. Certificate Application 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application The Resource PKI issues several types of certificates. Any entity that assigns Internet IP address space or AS numbers should acquire a certificate. This includes registries and ISPs. Additionally, entities that hold AS numbers or that have address space assignments from a registry, or that are multi-homed, should acquire a certificate under this PKI, even if they do not exchange BGP UPDATEs with ISPs. The (CA) certificates issued to these entities will include one or both of the extensions defined by RFC 3779, X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers, as appropriate. Most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of registry and ISP normal business practices, as an adjunct to address space and AS number allocation, and thus a separate specific application to request a certificate usually will not be necessary. 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities The enrollment process and procedures will be described by the CPS for each CA. An entity that desires one or more certificates should contact the organization from which it receives IP address space or AS number allocations. During the initial deployment of this PKI, an organization that already has resource allocations should contact the organization from which the resources were acquired to obtain appropriate credentials. 4.2. Certificate application processing CAs should make use of existing standards for certificate application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS, and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. Each CA will define the certificate request/response standards that it employs, via its CPS. 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance of certificates to these subscribers. It is important to note that the Resource PKI is never used to authenticate the identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the address blocks and AS numbers they hold. Because identity is not being vouched for Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 21 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 by this PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal organization names, etc. 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications Certificate applications will be approved based on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address space and AS number holders. Each CA will verify that the requester holds the corresponding private key for the public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the requestor. The details of how certificate applications are approved are described in the CPS for the CA in question. 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications No stipulation. Each CA may declare its expected time frame for processing certificate applications as part of its CPS. 4.3. Certificate issuance 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it will issue the corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository publication point. 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate The CA will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published. The means by which a subscriber is notified is defined by each CA in its CPS. 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities The CPS of each CA will indicate whether any other entities will be notified when a certificate is issued. 4.4. Certificate acceptance 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA will place the certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. Each CA shall state in its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate and notification to the subscriber. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 22 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA Certificates will be published in the RPKI distributed repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository publication point as per the conduct described in 4.4.1. The procedures for publication are defined by each CA in its CPS. 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI is provided below. 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage Each holder of an address space or AS number allocation will be issued an X.509 CA certificate containing appropriate RFC 3779 extensions. When the subjects of these certificates are LIRs/ISPs or network subscribers, they also shall issue EE certificates to themselves to enable verification of signed objects that they generate. 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage The relying parties in this PKI are entities who need to verify signed assertions about Internet resource holdings. 4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal A certificate should be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. If the issuing CA initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then that CA shall notify the holder in advance of the renewal process. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate should overlap that of the previous certificate, to ensure uninterrupted coverage. Certificate renewal should incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply. 4.6.2. Who may request renewal The certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the renewal process. For example, a certificate holder may request an early renewal if it wishes to change the public key, or if it expects to Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 23 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 be unavailable to support the renewal process at the normal expiration cycle. 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests Renewal processing must verify that the certificate in question has not been revoked. 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2. 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1. 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2. 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities The CPS of each CA will indicate whether any other entities will be notified when a certificate is issued. 4.7. Certificate re-key 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key Re-key of a certificate should be performed only when required, based on: 1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or 2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair The re-key operation can have dramatic consequences, requiring the re-issuance of all certificates issued by a re-keyed entity, so it should be performed only when necessary. In particular, if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate should incorporate the same public key rather than a new key. If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate must be revoked. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 24 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 Section 5.6 below notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key. 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, the CA that issued the certificate may initiate a rekey based on a verified compromise report. Note that care must be taken to verify the authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when the private key has been reported as compromised. 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate generation as defined in section 4.3. 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2) 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.1) 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.2) 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities The CPS of each CA will indicate whether any other entities will be notified when a certificate is issued. 4.8. Certificate modification 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of this PKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate modification are additions to the address space and/or AS number holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 25 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 When previously allocated address space or AS numbers are removed from a certificate, then the old certificate is revoked and a new certificate is issued. When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address space and AS allocations expanded. Revocation of the previous certificate is not required. 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification The certificate holder or issuer may initiate the certificate modification process. 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests The CA must determine that the requested modification is appropriate and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are followed. 4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2) 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.1). 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.2). 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities The CPS of each CA will indicate whether any other entities will be notified when a certificate is issued. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 26 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation Certificates can be revoked for several reasons. Either the issuer or subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate A certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the private key associated with that certificate, e.g., a manifest or ROA. 4.9.2. Who can request revocation The certificate holder or issuer may request a revocation. 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request A certificate holder must submit a request to the certificate issuer for a revocation. A certificate issuer must notify the certificate holder when revoking a certificate, however this notification requirement is satisfied by publication of a CRL by the issuer. 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified. There is no specified grace period for the subscriber in this process. 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request No stipulation. Each CA is free to specify its expected revocation processing time in its CPS. 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties A relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate. 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency The CRL issuance frequency is determine by each CA and stated in its CPS. Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL must be published at or before that time. A CA must set the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 27 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs The CPS for each CA will specify the maximum latency associated with posting its CRL to the repository system. 4.10. Certificate status services This PKI does not make use of OCSP or SCVP, because it is anticipated that the primary relying parties (ISPs) will acquire and validate certificates for all participating resource holders on a daily basis. These protocols are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status checking. Instead, retrieval of all changed or new certificates and CRLs on a daily basis is the anticipated mode of certificate status verification. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 28 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls 5.1. Physical controls Each CA will maintain physical security controls for its operation that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of address space and AS number allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in its CPS. 5.2. Procedural controls Each CA is expected to maintain procedural security controls that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of address space and AS number allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in its CPS. 5.3. Personnel controls Each CA will maintain personnel security controls that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of address space and AS number allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in its CPS. 5.4. Audit logging procedures Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in this section (5.4.1 to 5.4.8) will be addressed in its CPS. 5.4.1. Types of events recorded Audit records should be generated for the basic operations of the certification authority computing equipment. Audit records should include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) . Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications) . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions . Posting of any material to a repository . Any attempts to change or delete audit data Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 29 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log Each CA will establish its own procedures for review of audit logs. 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log Each CA will establish its own polices for retention of audit logs. 5.4.4. Protection of audit log The audit log should be protected based on current industry standards. 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures The audit log should be backed up based on current industry standards. 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments The PKI subsystems of a registry or ISP should participate in any vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of their normal business practice. 5.6. Key changeover When a CA wishes to change keys, it must acquire a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, well in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. Ideally, the private key that a CA uses to sign a certificate or CRL should have a validity period that is at least as long as that of any certificate being signed. However, since a certificate issued under this PKI may have a validity period that reflects the contractual relationship between the issuer and subject, this may lead to situations where an issued certificate has a validity period longer than that of the key used to sign the certificate. 5.8. CA or RA termination In this PKI, each CA is authoritative for a specified range of IP addresses and a specified set of AS numbers. If an organization acting as a CA in this PKI terminates operation without identifying a replacement, then the effective control of the IP addresses and AS numbers revert back to the issuing organization, and address space and AS number allocations that have been previously validated via that CA are invalidated as of revocation of the CA's certificate. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 30 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 6. Technical Security Controls The organizations that allocate IP addresses and AS numbers to subscribers are authoritative for these allocations. This PKI is designed to enable LIRs/ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the holders of the resources that have been allocated to them. Accordingly, the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for administering the allocation of IP address space and AS number data by the extant organizations. Details of each CA's security controls are described in the CPS issued by the CA. 6.1. Key pair generation and installation 6.1.1. Key pair generation In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subject, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address space or AS numbers. However, some CAs may offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion. Since the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI. Each CA will describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS. 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its CPS will describe the means by which private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer Each CA operating within the context of this PKI defines procedures whereby a subscriber requests IP address space (and/or AS numbers), authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The CPS of each CA will describe how these procedures are extended to support certificate issuance. The security of the procedures used by a subject to deliver its public key to a CA need only be commensurate with the security of the procedures already employed for management of the IP address space and AS numbers. 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties CA public keys for all entities other than default trust anchors are contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 31 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 will be published in the RPKI distributed repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates from the repositories. Public key values and associated data for the default trust anchors will be distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community. 6.1.5. Key sizes For RIR and IANA certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For all other certificates, the RSA keys will be either 2048 or 1024 bits. 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent (e) F4 (65,537). Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair. CAs are not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers. 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) The Key usage extension bit values shall be consistent with RFC 3280. For CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits shall be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) shall be set FALSE, and the extension shall be marked critical. End entity certificates in this PKI may include this extension, with appropriate bit values, as per RFC 3280, but such inclusion is not required. 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA will be described in the CPS issued by that CA. 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control CAs may employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI. The CPS for each CA will describe which, if any, multi-person controls it employs. 6.2.3. Private key escrow No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 32 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 6.2.4. Private key backup Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA should employ a secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the procedures for backing up a CA's private key will be described in the CPS issued by the CA. 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management 6.3.1. Public key archival Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys. 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods The resource allocations held by RIRs and the NIRs periodically change because these registries receive new allocations. Therefore it is appropriate for their certificates to have lifetimes that match the periodicity of these changes. However, to minimize disruption, the key pairs should be maintained across certificate changes. If LIR/ISP and subscriber certificates are tied to the duration of service agreements, these certificates should have validity periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements. In any case, the validity period for certificates will be chosen by the issuing CA and described in its CPS. 6.5. Computer security controls Each CA will document the technical security requirements it employs for CA computer operation in its CPS. 6.6. Life cycle technical controls 6.6.1. System development controls The CPS for each CA will document any system development controls required by that CA, if applicable. 6.6.2. Security management controls The CPS for each CA will document the security controls applied to the software and equipment used for this PKI. These controls shall be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for managing and allocating IP address and AS number resources. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 33 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls The CPS for each CA will document how the equipment (hardware and software) used for this PKI shall be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This will be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and AS numbers is handled. 6.7. Network security controls The CPS for each CA will document the network security controls employed for CA operation. These should be commensurate with the protection it employs for the computers used for managing allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers. 6.8. Time-stamping The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 34 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy]. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 35 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already authoritative for the management of IP address space and AS numbers, and the PKI simply supports verification of the allocation if these resources to subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other assessments are already used to ensure the security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers is sufficient for this PKI. The CPS for each CA will describe what audits and other assessments are used. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 36 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 9. Other Business And Legal Matters As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations managing the allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers are authoritative in their roles as managers of this data. They will operate this PKI to allow the holders of address space and AS number allocations to generate digitally signed data that attest to these allocations. Therefore, the manner in which the organizations in question manage their business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which they already manage business and legal matters in their existing roles. Since there is no single set of responses to this section that would apply to all organizations, the topics listed in sections 4.9.1 to 4.9.11 and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of RFC 3647 should be covered in the CPS issued by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these topics. 9.12. Amendments 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment The procedure for amendments to this CP is via written notice from IANA and the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period The IANA and the RIRs will provide one month's notice of a change to this CP. 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed If the IANA and the RIRs judge that the change(s) will not materially reduce the acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes, then there will be no change to the CP OID. If they judge that the change(s) will materially change the acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes, then there will be a new CP OID. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 37 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 10. Security Considerations According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular application. This document describes the CP for the Internet Address and AS Number PKI. There are separate documents (Certification Practice Statements (CPS's) that cover the factors that determine the degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate. The degree to which such a binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability). 11. IANA Considerations None. 12. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush and other members of the rescert community for reviewing this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress. [ARCH] Lepinski M., Kent S., Barnes R., "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing," work in progress. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 38 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 13.2. Informative References [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP- 4). IETF RFC 4271, January 2006. [REPOS] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and Michaelson, G., A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure, work in progress. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 39 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 Author's Addresses Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 Email: skent@bbn.com Derrick Kong BBN Technologies Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951 Email: dkong@bbn.com Karen Seo BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 Email: kseo@bbn.com Ronald Watro BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-2551 Email: rwatro@bbn.com Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 40 Internet-Draft Certificate Policy for the RPKI March 2009 Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Copyright Statement Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires September 2009 [Page 41